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Ethical brokerage and self-fashioning in Italian immigration bureaucracy 
 
Critique of Anthropology 38(4)  
 
Abstract 
 
In increasingly bureaucratised immigration regimes, experts who can assist migrants 
in their navigation of immigration law are in high demand. This article examines the 
role of community brokers – migrants who are self-styled immigration advisers – 
within the Italian immigration regime. Contributing to recent anthropological work 
which challenges the common characterisation of brokers as immoral or amoral, I 
show how becoming a migration broker is rooted in ethical projects of self-betterment 
that enable migrants to challenge their legally and economically marginalised position 
in Italian society. 
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Ethnographic studies of law and bureaucracy have long highlighted the unintended 
consequences, what might be called “side effects” (Ferguson 1990) or “spill overs” 
(Cabot 2014: 2), produced by legal and bureaucratic processes. Examining encounters 
within the Italian immigration regime, this article focuses on one particular such “spill 
over”: the emergence of immigration advisers, or community brokers, who assist 
migrants in their navigation of immigration law. When dealing with Italian 
immigration bureaucracy, the assistance of some kind of adviser is essential for even 
 2 
long-term migrants. Here I examine the manner in which becoming an immigration 
adviser is a means through which individuals with migrant backgrounds are able to 
overcome the low-status occupations to which migrants are generally restricted in 
Italy. 
 Anthropological work on law and bureaucracy has highlighted the affective 
potential of legal and bureaucratic processes which can produce uncertainty, 
indeterminacy, anxiety and hope for those involved within them (Kelly 2006; Navaro-
Yashin 2007; Nuijten 2003). In relation to immigration law, scholars have shown the 
way in which legal processes discipline subjects as “deportable” (De Genova 2002), 
create deep uncertainty in people’s lives (Gonzales and Chavez 2012), or, 
paradoxically, produce individuals as cultural insiders (Tuckett 2015). In this article, I 
show how engagements with immigration law produce possibilities for self-
fashioning and social mobility. By focusing on the role of community brokers, I show 
how styling oneself as an immigration adviser and expert enables these brokers to 
develop new subjectivities. As I will highlight, those whom I am grouping under this 
umbrella term – community broker – have various motives for their assistance work, 
but one shared outcome is the way in which their brokerage activities enable these 
individuals to fashion themselves in particular ways. These include fulfilling desires 
to be professional, gaining standing in their community, satisfying charitable impulses 
and fighting for social justice. Crucially, the role of a community broker offers 
possibilities for gaining social status that are generally not otherwise available to 
migrants in Italy. 
 In the anthropological canon, brokers have been described as “synapses” 
(Wolf 1956: 1075). They mediate between smaller and larger structures, whether 
between local and national society (Silverman 1965), voters and politicians (Lazar 
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2004; Koster 2012) or development programmes and local populations (Lewis and 
Mosse 2006). They bridge communication between persons, groups, structures and 
even cultures (Boissevain 1974: 148). Relying on the gap between individuals and the 
resources they need to access, brokers are often depicted as morally ambiguous 
figures (James 2011; Lindquist 2015b): self-interested entrepreneurs who manipulate 
the multiple worlds they occupy for their own profit, ultimately entrenching and 
reproducing existing inequalities (Blok 1974; Boissevain 1974). Despite increased 
ease of communication and movement, recent work has shown that the demand for 
brokerage services has remained high in modern society (Lindquist 2015a). 
Contemporary migration regimes are areas in which this demand is particularly high. 
Whether facilitating migrant mobility, easing communication channels or 
enabling the production and/or completion of bureaucratic paperwork, brokers are key 
figures in today’s highly bureaucratised global migration regime. Despite the 
indispensable role migration brokers often play, however, they are frequently 
condemned by academics, policy makers and development workers (Lindquist, 
Xiang, and Yeoh 2012). Usually framed as “traffickers” and “smugglers”, migration 
brokers are portrayed as callous and cruel, exploiting migrants and their labour for 
their own self-interest (Andrijasevic 2010; Kyle and Liang 2001; Salt and Stein 
1997). In particular, it is informal brokers rather than formal brokers, in the guise of 
lawyers or official labour recruitment agencies, who are painted in such negative 
colours. At best the informal broker is described as “illegal” or “illegitimate”, at worst 
as “criminal” and “immoral”, but in both cases her practices, relationships with clients 
and connections to the “formal” system are often left unexamined (Guevarra 2009; 
Guevarra 2006; Bakan and Stasiulis 1995). This broad-brush negative stereotype, 
however, overlooks a key fact: in an era in which migration regimes across the world 
 4 
are highly regulated and bureaucratised, the expertise of individuals who know how to 
navigate the “migration industry” (Lindquist 2010) is essential for migrants and 
migrant employers, as well as sending and receiving states. McKeown argues that the 
demonisation of migrant brokers is historically connected to liberalism and “the 
emerging ideal of the ‘free’ migrant as an atomized, self-motivated individual” (2012: 
21). Within the historical context of slavery and indentured labour, “brokerage came 
to be understood as a relic of pre-modern social organization, unsuited to the freedom 
and transparency of modern markets, personal liberty and the West” (2012: 23). This 
historical demonisation, he argues, has meant ignoring the essential role brokers play 
in helping migrants to navigate unfathomable bureaucracy and paperwork, as well as 
“drawing attention away from working conditions, laws and public attitudes that are 
equally responsible for migrant suffering” (McKeown 2012: 24).  
 Some recent ethnographic work on migrant brokers goes far in undoing these 
stereotypes and highlights how minute practices of brokerage are deeply intertwined 
with top-down legal and political processes. The flourishing of migration brokers and 
the demand for their assistance is directly related to the increased bureaucratisation 
and regularisation of migration (Lindquist 2012: 74; Alpes 2013; Alpes 2017). They 
cannot, therefore, be simplistically dismissed as “illegitimate” or “illegal”. Rodriguez 
(2010) and Guevarra’s (2009) respective work on the Filipino state as a labour broker, 
and Xiang’s work on private migrant recruitment agents in China (2012), highlight 
the manner in, and extent to which, states rely upon and facilitate brokerage practices. 
As well as both sending and receiving states, brokers, migrants and their social 
networks are all involved in brokerage systems (see also Spener 2009: 95). Further 
disrupting the stereotype of the broker as necessarily predatory is ethnographic work 
which shows how brokers and migrants are often fluid rather than distinct categories. 
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In their article, Chee et al. (2012) challenge the stereotype of the marriage broker as 
an unscrupulous businessman by showing that it is often Vietnamese brides 
themselves who act as matchmakers between women and Malaysian men. Becoming 
a marriage broker offers opportunities for newly married wives to build social and 
economic capital (Chee et al 2012: 95, 112). In Molland’s work on sex trafficking in 
Thailand (2012), meanwhile, the blurred boundaries between broker and migrant are 
again evident. He shows that while anti-trafficking programmes promote social 
networks as a means to create “safe” migration, it is within social networks that 
practices of coercion and deception take place, as the friends and kin of “victims” – 
who are possibly “trafficking victims” themselves – become complicit in the 
“victims’” trafficking. Finally, Lindquist’s work on petugas lapangan (PL), who work 
as field agents in labour migration brokerage in Indonesia, also disrupts the 
dichotomies of “victims” and “perpetrators” which frame debates around 
transnational migration (2012: 75). In his account, brokers were migrants themselves 
in the past, and some become migrants again in the future (see also Fernandez 2013). 
In fact, in Lindquist’s case study, as in all of the above examples, it is the brokers’ 
shared experiences with their prospective clients and their ability to gain trust and 
credibility which ensure their success. Successful brokerage, therefore, relies upon 
relationships of trust and friendship which may be instrumental but are not necessarily 
lopsided (Lindquist 2015b: 171; Kyle and Liang 2001; Spener 2009; Alpes 2017).  
Accordingly, migration brokers are essential for migrants’ successful 
navigation of immigration regimes as well as the functioning of the system itself. 
Their practices highlight the inseparability of the formal and the informal, the legal 
and the illegal, and between altruistic and profit-oriented networks (Lindquist, Xiang, 
and Yeoh 2012: 17) . While existing work focuses on migration brokers who facilitate 
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mobility transnationally, often in the guise of some kind of recruitment agency, the 
brokers that feature in this article specialise in assisting migrants with the unwieldy 
immigration bureaucracy in the “host” setting. Migrants’ dealings with documentation 
regimes begin rather than end with the crossing of borders. In the Italian setting, as 
elsewhere, immigration regimes are structured to prolong migrants’ temporary and 
precarious status, which means that those subject to them are continually required to 
deal with the cumbersome and highly complex documentation regime. Community 
brokers play a key role in this process. 
Classical anthropological analyses of brokers have tended to prioritise either a 
political economy analysis or a methodological individualist approach (James 2011; 
Lindquist 2015b). In the former the structural role of the broker as filling a gap 
between state and society is emphasised, while in the latter it is the broker’s position 
as a cunning and creative cultural figure. In what follows I provide a synthesis of 
these approaches by contributing to and building upon recent work which highlights 
the socially embedded role of the broker and challenges the notion that they are 
amoral or immoral (James 2011; Lindquist, Xiang, and Yeoh 2012; Lindquist 2015b). 
Focusing on four community brokers who acted as volunteers in a migration advice 
centre in a city in the province of Emilia Romagna in the North of Italy
1
, I show how 
brokers’ activities are ethically motivated, both in terms of a dissatisfaction with the 
exploitation of their own labour as well as a desire for self-improvement. By 
contextualising the migrant brokers’ activities within the Italian political, legal and 
economic setting, I show how becoming a migration broker is rooted in personal 
projects of social mobility within a context in which migrants are legally and 
economically marginalised. This article is based on 19 months’ fieldwork conducted 
across various sites within the city’s immigration bureaucracy nexus, including the 
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aforementioned advice centre, where I also acted as a volunteer alongside the 
community brokers. As a volunteer at the center I spent most of my time on the 
reception counter, but I also spent long periods of time with advisers at their desks in 
the back room participating in longer consultations. Much of my daily fieldwork was 
conducted in the space of the centre and other institutional settings, but over time I 
also developed close relationships with staff members, volunteers, and some clients, 
taking my research into more intimate and social spaces.  
 
 
Italy and the documentation regime 
 
In order to explore the role of the migration advice broker, there are two points that 
need to be addressed in relation to the Italian setting. Firstly, migrants in Italian 
society generally have a very low social and economic status. Brokerage activities, I 
suggest, are a means for some individuals to attempt to overcome the marginalised 
position migrants generally occupy. And secondly, Italian immigration bureaucracy, 
which I call the documentation regime, is characterised by extreme ambiguity, 
changing rules and discretionary decision-making, which make the services of 
advisers essential for migrants when navigating the regime.  
While Italy made a rather late entry as a “destination” country for migrants, 
with substantial numbers arriving only in the 1990s, in the last fifteen years among its 
European neighbours its migratory inflow is second only to Spain (Fullin and Reyneri 
2011: 118). Without a strong colonial history to shape migration patterns, Italy’s 
migrant population is highly diverse. Up until the 1990s the majority of arrivals came 
from North Africa, while in more recent years flows from Eastern European countries 
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have been the largest in number. According to official statistics, in 2009 the five 
largest nationality groups were Romanians, Albanians, Moroccans, Chinese and 
Ukrainians. Despite the heterogeneity of their backgrounds, precarious and 
discriminatory legal, economic and political circumstances unify the experiences of 
migrants in Italy. In line with other Southern European countries, migrants are 
restricted to the lowest status and poorest paid jobs. Male migrants fill unskilled and 
semi-skilled manual labour shortages, working in construction, agriculture and 
manufacture industries. Female migrants overwhelmingly work as domestic labourers 
in private homes as either live-in housekeepers or carers for the elderly, and often a 
mixture of the two. Research has shown that, in spite of any educational qualifications 
they may hold, migrants are unable to move out of these low status and poorly paid 
work sectors and are almost entirely excluded from non-manual jobs (Fullin and 
Reyneri 2011: 143). This reflects the structure of the Italian labour market, in which 
there are large labour shortages for jobs that native Italians will not do (Fullin and 
Reyneri 2011: 144) but a shortage of higher status professional and managerial jobs 
(Fullin and Reyneri 2011: 121). This mixture has resulted in high numbers of youth 
unemployment among Italians, as this increasingly educated group will not fill 
manual labour shortages yet are unable to secure higher status positions. While young 
Italians are able to live with their parents and hope for improved job opportunities to 
arise, migrants are usually forced to accept and remain in these low status manual 
jobs.
2
 As I outline below, immigration law, which ties legal status to employment, 
effectively traps migrants in these positions. These dynamics explain why migrant 
unemployment remains low despite overall high unemployment in Italy (Fullin and 
Reyneri 2011). For the community brokers discussed here, becoming an immigration 
consultant is a means through to which to carve out a different employment trajectory. 
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For example, translation of documents, interpreting at offices or filling out basic 
applications was a means through which Medhi,
3
 a Moroccan community broker who 
features throughout this article, was able to eke out a basic living for himself and 
avoid employment as a fruit picker or other similarly poorly paid wage labour.  
 Immigration law is intrinsic to migrants’ restriction to low status and low paid 
work sectors. Legal status is contingent on presenting a regular work contract and 
permits must be renewed every two years, thus ensuring that migrants stay in these 
poorly paid and low status jobs or risk losing legal status. The long-term permit and 
citizenship offer possibilities for secure legal status but both are notoriously difficult 
to obtain and it is not uncommon for long-term migrants or even those born in the 
country to lose legal status. During the course of my fieldwork I met several young 
adults who had arrived to Italy as infants but at the age of 18 had fallen into 
“illegality” as they were no longer able to renew their permits as dependants of their 
parents. Without being in full time education or holding a job contract, these young 
people who had grown up in the country had lost their right to live there. Calavita has 
described this as the “institutionalization of illegality”, whereby legal status is 
precarious and “doled out in small increments” making “stints of illegality” inevitable 
(Calavita 2005: 45). This institutionalisation of illegality and precarity highlights the 
role of immigration law in sustaining migrants’ vulnerability and tractability as 
workers (De Genova 2002: 439). As in other contexts, therefore, Italian immigration 
laws greatly contribute to the overall marginal and subordinate position that migrants 
occupy in Italian society.  
As well as the top down policies, the everyday workings of the immigration 
bureaucracy also work to produce uncertainty and indeterminacy in the lives of 
migrants and elevate the perceived need and desire for advice services. Firstly, Italian 
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immigration policies are set at the national level but their implementation varies 
across both space and time, making the immigration system confusing and 
unpredictable to navigate. While technically the law does not change in different 
geographic areas, in reality its practice varies according to the city’s Questura 
(Immigration Office). For example, while the Questura of one city judges that 
spouses of long-term permit holders are eligible to apply for this much-coveted 
document upon their immediate arrival to Italy, a neighbouring city Questura deems 
that all applicants must demonstrate proof of at least five years’ domicile in order to 
be eligible for the same permit, whether or not their spouse holds one. These small but 
important details mean that it is essential to receive well-informed advice when 
preparing and submitting applications.  
Secondly, Italian immigration policies are easily manipulated. This is relevant 
to the minutiae of applications as well as to entire policies. For example, self-certified 
declarations of domicile may be falsified if for some reason applicants are unable to 
state where they really reside (this commonly occurs in situations of overcrowded 
accommodation), while in the case of manipulation of entire policies, the 2009 
amnesty for undocumented domestic workers provides a good example. This amnesty 
allowed undocumented domestic workers to regularise their status with their 
employer which, given the high number of Italian households who employ migrant 
domestic workers, was not controversial among the public. In practice, however, the 
law allowed any undocumented migrant who was able to find or “pay” an employer to 
regularise their status. This led to sisters “employing” their undocumented brothers as 
“cleaners” in order to help them obtain permits and individuals charging a fee to 
undocumented migrants in order to act as their domestic work “employer”. The 
requirements for the application were minimal and, provided the paperwork was in 
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order, applications were processed by state institutions in spite of their obvious 
fallaciousness. In order to successfully take advantage of such policies, however, 
applicants required advice, assistance and sometimes contacts in order to complete the 
relevant paperwork. In relation to the law’s easy manipulation, the third characteristic 
of the Italian documentation regime, which generates the need and desire for expertise 
and advice, is the understanding that provided one has access to the correct resources 
and assistance, anything can be achieved. This notion that, in the words of one 
interlocutor, “the impossible is possible”, feeds the demand for expertise and advice. 
Thirdly, and finally, the vast amount of paperwork documenting the minute details of 
applicants’ lives, which is required for any application, intimidates most individuals 
into seeking out assistance. Most – if not all – of this paperwork can be completed and 
prepared by the applicants themselves. The highly technocratic language of Italian 
bureaucracy, however, means that even literate and educated migrants seek the help 
of some kind of immigration expert.  
 
The advice scene 
 
Reflecting the necessity of assistance when navigating the documentation regime, 
there was a host of immigration advice outfits across the city where I conducted 
fieldwork. These varied from costly lawyers situated in smart chambers to Pakistani-
run internet cafés where, for 10 euros, a permit renewal application could be 
completed on the spot. The services they offered included general information about 
the requisites needed into order to complete applications and form-filling services. 
Different organisations attracted different clients. HomeHelp, for example, was a co-
operative that specialised in domestic work contracts for private employers. An ever 
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growing elderly population and limited state provisions for care of the elderly mean 
that employment of cheap live-in carers who usually also act as cleaners is very 
common. While officially HomeHelp does not provide immigration-advice related 
services, given the dominance of female migrants in the domestic work sector, as well 
as the contingency of work on legal status, specialising in work contracts and permit 
renewal was a smart business move for the cooperative. The clientele of HomeHelp, 
therefore, largely consisted of female domestic workers and their Italian employers. In 
contrast, the internet cafes that operated as immigration form-filling businesses on the 
side were used exclusively by migrants. The on-the-spot service that such 
establishments offered was particularly popular if an individual’s permit was close to 
expiry and there was no time to wait for an appointment elsewhere. It is not necessary 
to complete any kind of training or to hold qualifications in order to give immigration 
advice or to complete applications. As a result, the growing number of organisations 
that offer assistance in relation to immigration advice is highly variable in the quality 
of advice and services offered. 
The most frequented advice organisation in the city was a trade union 
affiliated migrant centre where I volunteered. Its main functions were to act as a drop-
in advice clinic on issues relating to immigration law and to complete application 
forms on behalf of clients free of charge. These included applications for permit 
renewal, family reunification and citizenship. Its popularity was due to its long 
opening hours, central location and free services. Its services were free because the 
advice centre is a patronato. The term patronati refers to intermediary institutions 
attached to trade unions in which workers can receive free advice, assistance, 
protection, and representation (Agnoletto 2012: 13). Their role is to protect and 
advocate for welfare users and ensure that the welfare system is functioning correctly. 
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Although they are not part of the state infrastructure, the state does pay the patronato 
for each assistance file opened (Agnoletto 2012: 13). In general, however, clients 
were unaware that the advice centre was part of the trade union and the vast majority 
who frequented the centre were not trade union members. 
Adding to its popularity the centre also had an arrangement with the local 
Questura whereby once a week Alberto, a senior staff member, paid a visit to find out 
information on particular cases or to negotiate with the officials on behalf of 
individual clients with difficult cases. The possibility of accessing information from 
the otherwise impenetrable Questura greatly increased the centre’s client base as in 
general other advice organisations did not have such an arrangement. A similar 
arrangement did exist with the rival trade union’s migrant advice centre, but the rival 
centre’s shorter opening hours meant the centre where I volunteered dominated the 
scene.  
The centre’s main client base were migrants themselves needing advice on 
their or their family members’ applications. It was not uncommon, however, for 
Italian employers to accompany their migrant employees (usually those in domestic 
work) to the centre. Lawyers and other professionals working in the immigration 
advice sphere would also occasionally visit the centre looking for advice on how to 
advise their fee-paying clients. The presence of this type of client incited derision 
from those behind the counter and confirmed their opinion that the services of lawyers 
were often unnecessary.  
Staff members at the centre were generally individuals who had previously 
been employed elsewhere within the trade union and subsequently started work at the 
migrant advice centre. Two of the seven employees were Italian citizens with migrant 
backgrounds, while the remaining five were native Italians. The two with migrant 
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backgrounds had previously worked in factories where they had become trade union 
representatives and were later employed by the trade union. These individuals spoke 
about their roles sardonically. They implied that their employment was a strategic 
decision by the trade union to recruit other migrant workers as union members, who 
were increasingly filling many work sectors in which the trade union had traditionally 
held a strong presence. These two individuals worked between the advice centre and 
the central trade union offices. Volunteers were key to the functioning of the centre, 
in particular its reception counter. They tended to be either Italian students completing 
work experience or migrants. The community brokers who feature in this article all 
acted as volunteers. As I will explore below, some migrant volunteers became 
resentful about their role as they felt that they did the same work as employees but did 
not receive remuneration and were treated disdainfully by some staff members. 
Implied in their resentment was a sense that they were treated badly because of their 
migrant status despite providing essential work of interpreting and translation.  
 
Community brokers  
 
Early in my fieldwork I conducted participant observation at the Questura, joining the 
large numbers of people who arrived there early in the morning in order to get in line 
for the ticket allocation for application submission, permit collection or the fruitless 
attempt to access information regarding on-going applications. After several days of 
observation I began to recognise the faces of certain individuals who were regularly 
present and whom I also came across at the advice centre and other sites within the 
documentation regime. Dressed smartly and holding briefcases, these were self-styled 
immigration “experts” who acted as documentation brokers within their communities. 
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They possessed good Italian and understood the basics about immigration law. In 
general their clients were members of their own community with less cultural capital 
and weaker language skills. When I began fieldwork at the advice centre I learnt more 
about these self-styled brokers in the local context, several of whom volunteered 
there. 
  The services that these brokers provided were similar to those offered by the 
migrant advice centre and other organisations, but also extended beyond what was 
available in more formalised outlets. Mustapha and Naveed were two smartly dressed 
volunteers from Morocco and Pakistan respectively. At the centre, volunteers 
exclusively worked on the reception counter. Mustapha, however, held an almost 
permanent position at one of the desks in the back of the office where he would make 
phone calls and receive people who asked for him. His clientele were exclusively 
Arabic speaking and he would complete application forms for permit renewal, family 
reunification and other applications on their behalf. He also offered more illicit 
services, such as helping clients to procure a contratto di soggiorno (work contract for 
migrants) in order to renew a permit. During the process of permit renewal it is 
common practice for individuals to procure “false” work contracts. In these cases one 
individual would act as the “employer” for another. Whether or not one pays for this 
service depends on the relationship between the purported “employer” and 
“employee”. Individuals such as Mustapha act as a broker when the “employee” does 
not personally know somebody who would be able to act as their “employer”. In such 
cases there would certainly be a financial transaction of which the broker would take 
a cut (Tuckett 2015). While completing application forms for individuals without an 
appointment, providing information on immigration law and offering general 
assistance with translation were acceptable tasks for volunteers at the centre, 
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brokering work contracts in exchange for financial remuneration was not (a point I 
return to below).  
Unlike Mustapha, Naveed usually worked on the reception counter, alongside 
the other volunteers, giving out information regarding requisites for applications, 
booking appointments and checking the status of on-going applications online. He 
helped clients from all nationalities but was well known to those from the Pakistani 
community who would ask for him by name or as the “ragazzo Pakistano [Pakistani 
guy]” when they attended the centre. He also took a particular interest in citizenship 
applications and assisted a senior staff member in her completion and submission of 
clients’ applications. Naveed told me that he had once been fairly affluent in Italy, but 
18 months ago the metalwork factory where he worked had laid off many of its staff 
and he had since struggled to find another job. He was living off the money he 
received through his semi-redundancy (cassa integrazione), as well as doing some 
translation work for the Tribunale (courthouse), and spent most days at the advice 
centre. His current quality of life, he told me, was “not good”. Reduced to semi-
redundancy pay, he was now sharing a bedroom, while previously he had rented a 
private room in a shared apartment. The fact he was receiving semi-redundancy 
confirmed his story of earlier relative affluence, since such a benefit is fairly 
uncommon among migrants who are usually on more precarious work contracts with 
fewer benefits (Pastore and Villosio 2011: 14). As well as volunteering at the advice 
centre, Naveed also attended courses at the Centro del Impiego (job centre), reflecting 
his active desire to improve his employment credentials. Similar to Mustapha, it was 
later discovered that Naveed also completed permit renewal and other applications for 
a fee. Unlike Mustapha, however, Naveed did not use the centre and its services as an 
outpost for his own immigration business or to recruit clients. Instead in his spare 
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time he offered form-filling services mainly to members of the Pakistani community 
who did not want to wait for an appointment at the centre or, for some other reason, 
found it more convenient to pay Naveed ten euros for an on-the-spot permit renewal 
application.  
 Once it was discovered that Naveed and Mustapha were exchanging advice on 
immigration related matters for financial remuneration, both were asked to leave the 
centre. Since the centre in its official role as a patronato already received money from 
the state for the completion of applications, any kind of payment for services was 
totally forbidden. When clients did want to make individual payments to the adviser 
that helped them – which they often did due to a mixture of gratitude and an idea that 
it would help their application – they were told that they could make a donation to the 
trade union. Given this, the private payments Mustapha received for completing 
applications, clearly contravened his role as a volunteer. He was using the centre as an 
outpost for his own immigration business and charging clients for services that should 
have been free.  
Naveed’s case, however, is more complex and raises issues of who is expected 
to volunteer and who should be paid. He frequently hinted that he felt exploited in his 
role as a volunteer, essentially doing unpaid work while others were remunerated. On 
one occasion, he told me, “staff members are so rude to volunteers but there is no 
difference between what they [staff members] do, and what I do.” In the same 
conversation he insinuated that he had hoped to be employed at the centre but had 
since given up on that idea. While staff members interpreted his behaviour at the 
centre as underhand, Naveed seemed to have concluded that, since he could not find 
remunerative work at the centre, he would productively use his time as a volunteer to 
acquire knowledge that could then be employed elsewhere. He did not charge people 
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at the centre itself, but was prepared to charge people for services outside of it, 
reasoning that had he not done so they would have paid someone else. More broadly, 
he saw his actions as justified in a milieu in which everybody seemed to be making 
money.  
 Similarly fed up with feeling unappreciated was Medhi, another Moroccan 
volunteer who was in his early fifties. Medhi, a university graduate, lived a somewhat 
nomadic lifestyle. He had lived in France not long before I met him in Italy and 
described himself as a “citizen of the world”. He had an eccentric personality, at times 
becoming furious with clients if he felt they were rude while other times being gentle 
and affectionate. He was politically minded with an empathetic sensibility and a 
strong sense of social responsibility. For example, when the new head of the centre 
attempted to restrict its services such as free consultation with the lawyers to trade 
union members only, Medhi passionately resisted. He repeatedly exclaimed to me 
that, “we need to help people, Anna. We are here to help.” He was highly 
disapproving of Mustapha and others like him. In fact, it was pressure from Medhi 
that pushed the centre’s head to eventually expel Mustapha. He frequently brought 
clients whom he identified as particularly vulnerable, and who otherwise might have 
remained under the radar, to the attention of Alberto. This was so in the case of 
Stephanie, a Nigerian woman, whose child had been taken away by social services, or 
Sami, a Bangladeshi man, struggling with bureaucratic arrangements after his baby 
was stillborn.  
During my fieldwork period, Medhi was a regular presence at the centre, 
except for a period of several weeks when he was employed by HomeHelp. Shortly 
after his employment at the organisation, however, Medhi resumed his voluntary 
work at the centre, saying that he had resigned. He explained that he did not want to 
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be part of an organisation that charged for services that people could receive for free 
at the trade union-run advice centre. His decision had economic consequences, 
reducing him to the slim pickings he gained from an informal certificate translation 
service and summer work as a fruit picker. 
Throughout my fieldwork period (2009-2011), Medhi stuck to his principles in 
spite of his financial difficulties. He never charged for the advice services he 
provided, other than for the translations of certificates. However, when I met him on 
returning to my fieldsite in November 2012, he had distanced himself from the centre 
and was operating an informal immigration advice business himself. I learned of 
Medhi’s new venture when I and our fellow volunteer Chiara ran into him in the city 
centre. He was accompanied by a tall, dishevelled-looking Moroccan man. As we 
walked together, Medhi explained that he had been helping his companion, who was 
walking a couple of metres behind us. “Poverino [poor thing] he has lost all his 
documents,” he explained. Medhi then proceeded to tell us how the man had paid him 
150 euros for three days of help with replacing his permit, identity card and the other 
lost documents. “We’ve been to the Carabinieri [military police], Comune 
[municipality], Questura, all over. He pays me 50 euros a day – and it has taken three 
days to sort everything out.” Once we arrived in the centre of town, Medhi insisted on 
buying us coffees (in the past it would have been me or Chiara who paid) and went 
inside to order while Chiara and I sat down at an outside table. As we drank our 
coffees the conversation turned to the advice centre. He told us: 
 
I never go there anymore. I am fed up with her [Maria – the new head of the centre]. She 
keeps calling me, asking me to go back there to act as an interpreter but I won’t – she can 
learn Arabic herself. Comasco [the centre’s lawyer] is just as bad, he calls me in to 
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translate, charges the client 500 euros and what do I get? Grazie! [Thank you]. Well I’m 
not called Signore Grazie [Mr Thank You]. 
 
On our way home, I discussed his comments with Chiara, an Eritrean who had 
migrated to Italy when she was 13 years old. She was shocked that Medhi, previously 
so opposed to charging people for assistance, was now doing so. “He has become like 
everybody else,” Chiara said. “He is just exploiting other Moroccans who can’t speak 
Italian. He is only providing a translation service. He’s hardly an expert.” In response 
I suggested that Medhi was only filling a gap that someone else might have done in 
his absence, and pointed to his financial need. Chiara found this rationale morally 
reprehensible. “If he needs money, he should go and work in a factory like everybody 
else [other migrants]. It is not an excuse!” In her eyes, community brokers who 
profited from navigating the complicated and time-consuming documentation regime 
were ultimately complicit in perpetuating migrants’ structural marginalisation.  
It was certainly the case that Medhi’s decision to charge for interpreting was at 
odds with his previously espoused attitude. But something else was at play: the 
importance and due recognition of, and value attributed to, relevant skills. His rant 
about the new head of the centre and the lawyer Comasco highlight his resentment 
about providing work voluntarily for which others were paid. Besides, Medhi was not 
exactly contradicting his previous beliefs. The service he was now providing – 
accompanying a migrant from place to place and translating for him while helping to 
navigate the bureaucracy – was not available free at the centre, or anywhere else. 
Medhi’s statement that he was not “Signore Grazie!” echoes arguments made 
in relation to peer-educator programme in South Africa (James 2002; McNeill 2011). 
Those running HIV peer-educator schemes imagine the educators – a type of broker – 
to be inspired by community-minded sentiments. In practice, however, in a context of 
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high unemployment, becoming a peer educator provides an opportunity for upward 
class mobility and other career options (James 2002; McNeill 2011: 150-151). These 
cases highlight the way in which motivations to volunteer or to peer educate must be 
contextualised. The Italian migrant-advisers I worked with, in a similar vein, were 
seeking to improve their career opportunities, status and material conditions in a 
context in which migrants are generally restricted to the lowliest work sectors. The 
fact that they charge for services is not evidence of amoral behaviour, but rather an 
ethically informed critique of their own labour exploitation. 
 
 
Self-fashioning through brokerage 
 
Chiara’s criticism of the activities of migrant-advisers gives the impression that 
Mustapha, Naveed and Medhi were making profit at the expense of their clients. In 
some ways her position is reminiscent of Marxist analysts who understand brokers as 
amoral individualists who exploit the gap between the poor and the resources to 
which they need access for their own personal gain (James 2011: 320). In reality, 
however, the brokers’ clients, who were generally employed full-time with fairly 
secure incomes, were materially better off than the brokers themselves. While the 
clients’ salaries were low in comparison to national salaries – given the poorly paid 
jobs to which migrants are restricted in Italy – in comparison to the community 
brokers, who were not in formal employment, the clients were relatively financially 
secure. In fact these brokers, like many others in the Italian setting (both migrants and 
non-migrants), were effectively employed in the informal labour market, which also 
put their legal status at risk (Reyneri 1998). While some individuals choose to work 
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“off the books” (sometimes entirely but frequently partially) in efforts to reduce 
money owed in taxes, for migrants informal work carries potential risks since 
evidence of employment and salary are necessary for permit renewal. Those who do 
work informally, therefore, must produce false documents relating to work and salary 
in order to renew their permits. Mehdi, for example, was in a difficult situation when 
he needed to renew his permit during my fieldwork period. He had come to Italy as 
the “husband” of a Moroccan woman already resident in Italy, who he described as a 
“dear friend”. When this woman passed away Mehdi needed to renew his permit on 
the basis of work rather than family, meaning he needed to provide a contract and 
salary. As he did not have either of these, a friend from the trade union helped him by 
“employing” him as a domestic worker. These brokers were not, therefore, callous 
and greedy individuals motivated exclusively by financial gain. Rather they too were 
in insecure positions and providing immigration services acted as a way of resisting or 
avoiding the otherwise low-status work to which migrants are restricted, while also 
eking out a rather meagre and precarious existence.  
Despite her criticisms, Chiara too was carving out a higher status identity for 
herself as an immigration-expert. While her comments form part of her own ethical 
project of fighting for migrants’ rights through solidarity, they do not take into 
account the inequality within the hierarchy of brokerage in which she too was 
involved. Having lived in Italy for decades and holding Italian citizenship thanks to 
her Italian-Eritrean paternal grandfather, her situation was rather different to that of 
Medhi. Indeed, as will be further explored below, her fluent Italian, high-status job, 
secure legal status and good connections meant it was significantly easier for her to be 
uncompromisingly motivated in terms of the public good. Furthermore, while she 
strongly criticised those who profited from the documentation regime, she was 
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engaged in processes of self-fashioning through her role as an immigration expert in a 
manner not totally different from the others. 
Chiara’s personal trajectory is unlike the other three community brokers 
discussed here. She migrated to Italy from Eritrea when she was 13 years old 
accompanied by her older brother and father, whose own father was an Italian 
national. She was schooled in Italy, growing up in the country in the 1980s at a time 
when there were very few migrants or non-white people in the country. She “feels” 
neither Italian nor Eritrean, while also identifying as both. Her younger brother, who 
migrated to Italy many years later frequently teased her for the way she spoke 
Tigrinya, which had become a foreign tongue to her after many years rarely speaking 
the language. Yet, she also wrestled with her Italian identity which was in large part 
due to the racialised discrimination that she has experienced throughout her life in 
access to work, housing and everyday social encounters (Tuckett 2016). 
Chiara moved to the city where I met her in her 20s, and first worked as a 
dishwasher in restaurant kitchens. Some years after her arrival in the city she came 
across the newly opened advice centre which, at the time, was a much smaller 
establishment run by the man who founded it and a small team of volunteers. She 
soon became a member of this first set of volunteers who, like her, held strong 
political views and were deeply motivated to improve migrants’ rights in Italy. She 
has continued to volunteer at the centre in some capacity ever since. Her occupational 
status has somewhat improved since her dishwashing days and by the time of my 
fieldwork she was employed by the Comune (municipality). Her employment 
trajectory contrasts with that of most migrants, having given her opportunities to work 
beyond the usual job sectors to which migrants are restricted. She explained that her 
employment at the Comune owed much to her knowledge about and use of positive 
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discrimination policies, which ensure that a certain quota of public servants are 
registered as disabled. Chiara has a registered disability which qualified her to be 
employed in such a quota. Such permanent public service jobs are highly coveted in 
Italy and like other public servants, Chiara benefitted from the job security, good 
salary and flexible hours that the position provides. Ultimately, however, she found 
her work boring and unsatisfying and spent much of her time dedicated to what she 
calls her “casi sociali” (social cases). Over the years spent as a public servant and 
volunteer at the centre, Chiara has cultivated a huge network of contacts in various 
offices whom she calls on when assisting her “casi sociali”. She has contacts at the 
Questura, Prefettura (the prefecture, where some applications relating to immigration 
are dealt with), the Comune, trade union and the centre-left political party Partito 
Democratico. Her flirtatious and charismatic personality, sense of humour and sharp 
intelligence make her contacts amenable to her various requests for favours and 
assistance.  
Chiara came across many of her casi sociali when volunteering at the centre, 
but she also assisted her neighbours and others she encountered in her day-to-day life. 
Her background made her in demand with the Eritrean community among whom she 
was known as an immigration expert. But, like Medhi, she was determined not to 
prioritise her co-nationals over others, and I assisted her in helping countless people 
from various backgrounds throughout my fieldwork. Depending upon the specificities 
of a particular client’s problem, after listening to their account she would make a 
series of phone calls to her various contacts to see if she could somehow solve the 
issue. At other times she would visit the local Questura in person, bringing trays of 
pasticcini (pastries) in order “to sweeten them up”, she would say, while winking 
conspiratorially. While at the Questura she would visit several of the people she knew 
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to find out information about a particular case or to ask them to reconsider a decision. 
Her network of contacts was so wide that other staff members at the centre often 
called on her to help them with their own clients.  
Although Chiara was certainly motivated by her strong sense of social justice 
and desire to make the world a better place, she also visibly thrived in her role as 
charismatic broker in which she skilfully drew favours and promises from contacts in 
order to help her clients. In this sense, her role was not so different from the 
behaviour of those whom she condemned. While she would never accept any 
financial reward for the work she did – even being bought a coffee made her feel 
compromised – the nature of the shifting, indeterminate and unjust documentation 
regime enabled her to carve out a particular role for herself which gave her meaning, 
satisfaction and high social standing. Additionally, while Chiara’s uncompromising 
critique of the others is partly due to her own experience of suffering in the past, 
ultimately she had come to hold secure and prestigious employment of a kind that 
Mustapha, Naveed and Mehdi could only have dreamt about.  
In their differing ways, then, for each of these community brokers becoming 
an immigration-expert acted as a means through which they could create possibilities 
that were generally not possible for migrants in Italy. Mustapha was able to become a 
smartly dressed businessman and a point of reference among the Arabic speaking 
community. Having been unsuccessful in securing a job at the centre, Naveed used his 
time there to nonetheless learn the intricacies of Italian immigration law in order to 
develop his own mini-business during his period of unemployment. Medhi, who 
struggled to hold down a normal work schedule was able to make ends meet through 
offering individuals who needed assistance in their basic navigation of bureaucracy. 
And Chiara was able to tolerate her boring job and fulfil her political desire to 
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campaign for migrants’ rights by dedicating much of her time to her casi sociali. 
While they differed in their knowledge and experience of immigration law, by being 
able to learn the basics of immigration bureaucracy, these individuals were able to 
carve out particular roles for themselves. In contrast to the usual accounts of 
immigration law and the manner in which it works to create vulnerable and deportable 
subjectivities, here immigration law has a different role. The shifting and opaque 
nature of the immigration bureaucracy acted as a means through which more 
experienced migrants could fashion themselves as professional and authoritative 
experts – a role which, as a migrant in Italy, was otherwise almost impossible to 
develop. 
Chiara may be correct in her assertion that Medhi and others like him were 
ultimately profiting from the Kafkaesque documentation regime that created the 
necessity of an “expert’s” assistance. But they were also challenging the conditions 
which migrants endure in the Italian context and were using their knowledge of the 
immigration bureaucracy as a way in which to re-fashion themselves and resist 
marginalisation. If immigration bureaucracies function as mechanisms to ensure 
migrants’ continual marginalised and insecure position in society (Calavita 2005; De 
Genova 2002), then these brokers were turning the mechanism on its head, using 
immigration bureaucracy as a tool with which to overcome such marginalisation and 
create alternative life opportunities. 
 
 
Conclusion 
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In increasingly bureaucratised immigration regimes migration brokers, who are 
experts in “the politics of micro-documentation” (Lindquist 2012: 88), are in high 
demand. In Italy, where becoming and staying a “documented” migrant involves the 
production of paper trails across state institutions, private companies, employers, 
trade unions and landlords, individuals and organisations which offer assistance are 
indispensable for migrants’ successful navigation of the immigration bureaucracy. In 
this article I have presented four community brokers who fill the gap produced by the 
immigration regime’s simultaneous creation of uncertainty and possibility. These 
brokers play key roles in both assisting migrants in their navigation of the regime as 
well as enabling the system to function, supporting the classical anthropological 
finding that “the formal order is always parasitic on informal processes” (Scott 1998: 
310).  
Exploring these four community brokers’ trajectories, I have shown that their 
brokerage practices go beyond filling a gap in the market. Whether motivated by the 
desire to gain prestige or to fight for social justice, brokers’ activities are imbued with 
meaning and the pursuit of ethical value. These observations firmly dispel the 
common characterisation of brokers – and in particular migration brokers – as corrupt 
or immoral. As Chiara’s strong opinions highlight, and in line with anthropological 
work on brokerage, however, such community brokers are morally ambiguous. They 
help migrants navigate unfathomable bureaucracy, but at the same time enable the 
exclusionary and Kafkaesque immigration bureaucracy to function. They gain some 
prestige and social mobility through their fellow migrants’ need of assistance, but are 
also often in more materially insecure positions than their clients.  
While the anthropological record has tended to define brokers as either 
exploitative profiteers or creative hustlers, Deborah James argues that we should 
 28 
instead understand the broker as both product and producer of the society in which 
she or he emerges (James 2011: 319). This assessment rings true here. As migrants, 
community brokers emerge from the marginalised political and economic contexts in 
which they are situated and are motivated by the desire for social mobility. By acting 
as brokers they are producing a critique of their own labour exploitation as well as 
carving out alternative possibilities for themselves. In this case, therefore, brokerage 
practices should be understood as ethically imbued acts in which knowledge of 
immigration law acts a means through which individuals can engage in projects of 
social mobility.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 The name of the city is not disclosed in order to protect research participants’ anonymity. 
2
 It should be noted that high levels of unemployment, as well as the implementation of austerity 
measures, are pushing many young Italians to leave the country and become migrants themselves.  
3
 Names of individuals and organisations have been changed in order to protect anonymity 
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